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Abstract:
Recent scholarship on civil disobedience in Northern Ireland primar-
ily focuses on the immediate period before the breakout of violence 
in 1969, and in some cases, on the mass protests of the late 1970s 
around the H-Block/Armagh prison protests. This paper attempts 
to fill the gap between these two periods in its analysis of the rent 
and rates strike of the early 1970s, which was initiated in response 
to the re-introduction of internment without trial. In doing so, it 
positions itself against simplistic approaches towards civil disobe-
dience as either oppositional, or causally linked, to armed struggle. 
Instead, it probes the complexity of its relationship to armed struggle 
in relation to the Northern Irish and British state’s security policies.
Keywords: Civil Disobedience, Housing, Internment, Northern Ire-
land Troubles, Rent Strike
1. Introduction
Civil disobedience in Northern Ireland during the conflict, euphemisti-
cally described as the Troubles, has received attention from historians hoping 
to understand its success and failures in relation to the armed struggle, either 
as a proxy for Republicanism or a mechanism to sustain it, or as an under-
lying reason for a perceived descent into violence as the 1960s gave way to 
the bloodshed of the 1970s. Extra-parliamentary protest is often treated as 
an addendum to armed struggle and a means by which violence paved the 
way for electoral politics.
This paper addresses the rent and rates strike, which started in response 
to the re-introduction of internment without trial by the Northern Ireland 
Prime Minister Brian Faulkner in August 1971. The aim is to explain the 
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emergence of the rent strike, the measures taken by the governments in Bel-
fast and Westminster to suppress the strike, and to frame it within the general 
trajectory of violent and non-violent political struggle during the decade. In 
doing so, it will be pertinent to touch on similarities and differences between 
the anti-internment rent strike and other forms of civil disobedience during 
this time both in Ireland and Britain. Northern Ireland has precariously re-
mained within the United Kingdom since the southern 26 counties of Ire-
land gained independence following the 1919-1921 war of independence, and 
throughout the history of the province, acts of civil disobedience have been 
treated differently to those in Britain. This was partly as a result of the char-
acteristics of the security forces in Northern Ireland, which were established 
to maintain the British unionist ascendancy and repress the minority Cath-
olic population, who were viewed as dangerous to the political settlement.
The anti-internment rent and rates strike has received scant attention in 
accounts of the early 1970s. It is mentioned briefly in the memoirs of Derry-
based civil rights protagonist Eamonn McCann and SDLP politician Austin 
Currie but, compared to the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the street 
movement around the prison protests later in the 1970s, the rent strike has 
drawn next to no interest (Currie 2004; McCann 1980). With many stud-
ies focused on political violence and the rise of the IRA in this period (Hen-
nessey 2005; 2007), it is understandable how this event can be overlooked. 
However this relies on a somewhat false – or at least unhelpful – binary of 
violent and non-violent forms of action, and fails to appreciate the political 
aspect of armed struggle and the relationship between these various outlets 
for political grievances.
The re-introduction of internment in 1971 illustrates this well: many of 
those detained in the first internment sweep were political activists involved 
in the civil rights movement rather than the Republican armed struggle such 
as Michael Farrell of People’s Democracy, and even Belfast city councillor 
James O’Kane1. A private memo from the Prime Minister of Northern Ire-
land Brian Faulkner on 18 February 1972 stated that “all internees are, on 
the evidence available, either members of the IRA or otherwise involved in 
terrorism”2. Those opposing internment were assumed to be sympathisers of 
the use of violence and therefore of concern to the security services. Quite un-
surprisingly, a police spokesperson told the Belfast Telegraph that the names of 
marchers at a West Belfast anti-internment rally in January 1972 were noted 
1 Linen Hall Library (LHL), Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC), P1421, S. 
Ó Tuathail, They Came in the Morning (Official Sinn Féin, 1972), Belfast.
2 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), CAB/9/B/83/7, “Detention and 
Internment under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts”, 18 February 1972, Memo-
randum by the Prime Minister of Home Affairs on Internment, Belfast.
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by police3. Furthermore, the way in which the state contended with the rent 
and rates strike itself had direct implications on security strategy – despite 
huge debts for gas and electricity payments, disconnection was said to only 
be an option in middle-class areas due to the potential destabilisation that 
it would provoke in working-class neighbourhoods, areas that were prone to 
police and army incursion and rioting4.
This long overdue study of the rent and rates strike is therefore useful 
for precisely this reason – namely, an understanding of the state’s response 
to its concerns over the popularity of the Republican struggle. Firstly, the 
attempt to counter what it perceived as popular support; the figure of senior 
military theorist and Brigadier Frank Kitson was a bête-noir to the IRA, and 
his elucidation of Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare (Bennett and Cormac 
2014, 106) and the subsequent need to starve the IRA of their public sup-
port has become a regularly referenced epithet. But it was not just the hearts 
and minds campaigns to cut off the lifeblood of the IRA by way of its civil-
ian support that constituted British policy; as we see with the response to the 
rent strike, there was a concerted effort to re-shape the citizens of Northern 
Ireland by producing patterns of behaviour that would stymie the momen-
tum for future civil disobedience. In addition to this, it was part of a funda-
mental change at a conjunctural moment in how social security apparatus 
was used and understood, which would irreversibly alter the provision of so-
cial housing and benefits in Britain and Northern Ireland. For this reason, 
the context of similar contentious action in the rest of the United Kingdom 
and the government’s response is pertinent to this study.
More broadly, this study of the rent and rates strike is useful for those 
with a desire to understand the ebb and flow of the civil rights movement 
and the gap in knowledge of the time frame from the late 1960s demonstra-
tions to the prisoner support group of the late 1970s and subsequent rise of 
Sinn Féin. As such, many of the sources used are from information sheets 
and newspapers produced by civil rights groups, republicans and radical left 
groups who supported the strike. Declassified files from the Stormont cabinet 
meetings are used to illustrate the perspective of the state as well as material 
from the National Archives in London – although formal power remained 
in Belfast until direct rule was implemented in March 1972, the Westmin-
ster cabinet’s Joint Intelligence Committee’s role in security matters follow-
ing the deployment of troops in 1969, and particularly after disturbances in 
June 1970, are instructive to our understanding of the complex and some-
times contradictory approaches of senior politicians, heads of security forces 
and intelligence services. Beginning with an overview of the re-introduc-
3 LHL, Belfast Telegraph, 3 January 1972, Belfast, Microfiche.
4 PRONI, CENT/1/3/27, Northern Ireland Office Press Release, 15 May 1974.
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tion of internment in 1971 and the response by the Catholic community in 
Northern Ireland, the following section will then focus on the mechanisms 
of the rent strike and the dynamics between the main protagonists. Section 
four will turn to the Northern Ireland administration’s response to the rent 
strike, with a particular emphasis on the emergency legislation brought in 
to deal with non-payment, followed by a summary of the effects of the leg-
islation. The concluding section will then look at the early 1970s within the 
trajectory of civil disobedience in Northern Ireland in relation to the conflict.
2. Internment and civil resistance
The use of detention and internment without trial was enabled by regu-
lations 11 and 12 respectively of the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Act (Northern Ireland), a controversial piece of legislation introduced by the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland at the inception of the state following the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act and the 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty. The first wave 
of internment took place in May 1922 when around 500 Sinn Féin mem-
bers and sympathisers were interned, its use being inexorably connected to 
the origins of the province of Northern Ireland (Donohue 1998, 1092). This 
is not to say it was peculiar to Northern Ireland – following the 1916 Easter 
Rising, almost 2,000 Irish citizens were interned in Frongoch camp, Wales; 
during the IRA Border Campaign of 1956-1962, the Republic of Ireland in-
troduced internment simultaneously with Northern Ireland. Irish history – 
particularly since the revolutionary period of 1916-1923, and specifically in 
the partitioned North – is haunted by the use of this exceptional measure.
As the civil rights movement of the late 1960s was increasingly repressed 
by police, and as violence escalated after British soldiers were sent first into 
Derry’s Bogside then Belfast in August 1969, the Northern Ireland Parlia-
ment relied on draconian legislation to restore order, for example the 1970 
Criminal Justice (Temporary Provisions) Act, which imposed mandatory 
sentences for certain offences during an ‘emergency’ period starting 30 June 
1970. Internment was mooted by the Stormont administration in May 1970 
and again in August, after rioting in Belfast that June, which had prompted 
the Criminal Justice Act and emergency period, as well as the use of curfews5.
The civil rights movement of the 1960s has been characterised in opposition 
to the Republican armed struggle of the 1970s, and in some cases as a cause of 
the descent into violence. Historian Thomas Hennessey places responsibility 
for the outbreak of hostilities on the civil rights movement, arguing that the 5 
5 The National Archives (TNA), CJ/4/462, “Internment without Trial in Northern 
Ireland: Possible Imposition. Policy on Home Office Authorisation and Involvement. Cut-
tings and Correspondence”, 21 May 1970.
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October 1968 march in Derry “altered everything”, making British intervention 
“inevitable” (2005, 145). Hennessey’s claim that British oversight by 1970 should 
have reassured Catholics who were distrustful, with reason, of the Stormont 
government is somewhat supported by the view from London that Catholics 
were primarily the victims, not perpetrators, of political violence (Hennessey 
2005, 394; O’Halpin 2008, 669)6. Indeed, the Joint Intelligence Committee 
placed blame for the growth of political violence squarely on the shoulders of 
the failures of the Northern Ireland government (O’Halpin 2008, 668). 
Despite the growing importance of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
in security decision-making by the end of 1970, it repeatedly expressed fears 
that the loyalty of the predominantly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) Special Branch could be strained under direct rule, and particular-
ly if the Westminster government “came into direct confrontation with the 
hard-line Protestants”. It could therefore rely on Special Branch on coverage 
of “all except Protestant targets”7. Although the Joint Intelligence Committee 
provides crucial insights into the antagonistic relationships between MI5 and 
RUC Special Branch and the different approaches of the varying authorities, 
Hennessey’s depiction of the Westminster government as a neutral arbiter, 
able to oversee action against discrimination with fairness, is confounded by 
this example of the hold which the RUC had over the British government, 
whether real or imagined. There was a clear apprehension regarding the 
RUC, which gave way to major criticisms of its Special Branch from 1969 
to 1972, and plans were made in spring 1971 to build parallel intelligence 
structures to avoid reliance on the RUC8. In practice, the fear of a “protes-
tant backlash” meant that intelligence on Protestant paramilitaries was not 
acted upon until February 1973, eighteen months after the introduction of 
internment (McCleery 2015, 170).
The special powers regulation for internment was finally put into action 
on the morning of 9 August 1971, under the guise of Operation Demetrius. 
On that day, 342 men, all of whom were Catholic, were arrested by British 
soldiers, detained, taken to regional holding centres (Ballykinler, Magilli-
gan, Girdwood Park) where they were interrogated by RUC Special Branch, 
after which they were taken to the prison ship HMS Maidstone or Crumlin 
Road jail (Bennett 2010, 191). Derry’s Bogside and Creggan estate, Catho-
lic enclaves on the west of the city’s Foyle river, defended themselves with 
6 TNA, CJ/4/462, O’Halpin quotes Joint Intelligence Committee records from 1970.
7 TNA, CAB/190/8, “Northern Ireland Intelligence Working Party: Meetings and 
Memoranda”, 10 March 1971.
8 TNA, CA/185/3, “Joint Intelligence Committee (A) (JIC(A)) Meetings”, 1 January 
1970 – 25 June 1970; TNA, CAB/190/8, “Northern Ireland Intelligence Working Party: 
Meetings and Memoranda”, 8 October 1970 – 17 April 1972.
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barricades, which remained up from the day of internment until the British 
Army’s Operation Motorman tore them down in July 1972. Thousands of 
Catholics fled the North to the Republic of Ireland as refugees seeking asy-
lum. The position of internees was dubious to say the least. Internees were 
detained based on Special Branch intelligence and initially not subject to any 
form of judicial decision, so in essence subject to at best a quasi-legal process 
which had been introduced upon the decision of the government.
In October 1971, the International Red Cross visited the internment 
camp at Long Kesh near Lisburn, just outside of Belfast, and reported on 
the differences between sentenced prisoners and internees, stating: “The in-
ternee is a man without a future”9. This strikes precisely on the position of 
internees as simultaneously subject to, yet outside of, the legal system, and 
thus in a position of ambiguity. Such a position is underlined by the point 
raised in the local Republican newspaper the Andersonstown News in 1974 
that technically, under the 1973 Emergency Powers Act, those detained were 
not guilty of an offence, but it would be illegal for them to escape their de-
tention inside the Long Kesh internment camp10. Although the Detention 
of Terrorists Order introduced in November 1972 formalised a quasi-judi-
cial process of reviewing internment cases independent of the executive, the 
character of the legal powers themselves magnified the tenuous legal posi-
tion of internees11. The special powers provided for a permanent-exception 
and were presented as a reality rather than an option which, ideally, would 
be phased out, if only the situation allowed – the Northern Ireland govern-
ment announced in September 1971 that their objective was “to bring about 
as soon as possible a situation in which all emergency measures – not only 
internment – but also such measures as minimum mandatory sentences – 
can be phased out without risk”12. Contrary to this presentation of intern-
ment as purely a security necessity, its political nature is clear as indicated 
by the demographics of the men interned, aimed at Catholics and conflat-
ing the Catholic community with armed Republicanism. Additionally, a le-
gal review written in 1986 underlined the political use of internment and in 
particular the detention of innocent men to taint them as Provisional IRA 
members, and the cynical increase in internee numbers to placate unionists 
at opportune moments and also the increase in internee releases to concili-
ate the broadly anti-internment mainstream nationalist Social Democratic 
Labour Party (SDLP) (Spjut 1986, 731).
9 PRONI, CAB/9/B/83/7, “Detention and Internment under the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Acts”, 18 February 1972.
10 LHL, NIPC, Andersonstown News 5, 5, 8 June 1974, Microfiche.
11 For details of internment legislation see Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard (1975).
12 LHL, NIPC, “Statement by Northern Ireland Government”, 21 September 1971.
NO RENT, NO RATES 25 
Before moving on to look more closely at the rent strike, it is worth paying 
attention to the colonial dimension of internment. This is a crucial element 
to the imposition and implementation of emergency regulations in Northern 
Ireland, but also it helps scholars to distinguish between forms of civil disobe-
dience in Ireland and those in Britain. Internment was a common feature of 
British colonialism: internment camps were in place right across the empire 
to deal with anti-colonial dissidents. Hola Camp in Kenya was one striking 
example that provides a useful comparison for Northern Ireland (McCleery 
2015, 14). Ian Cobain’s Cruel Britannia traces the use of torture throughout 
post-war British colonial history, providing documentary evidence of the use 
of the five techniques of torture in Cyprus, Aden and Kenya – particularly in 
Hola Camp – that were then used on internees in August and October 1971 
and became the subject of the 1978 European Court case (Cobain 2012). 
Indeed, whilst denying the use of torture, British Home Secretary Reginald 
Maudling admitted that the “principles applied in the interrogation of suspects 
in Northern Ireland and the methods employed are the same as those which 
have been used in other struggles against armed terrorists in which Britain has 
been involved in recent years”. The Parker Report of March 1972 admitted that 
the five techniques had “played an important part in counter insurgency opera-
tions in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya and Cypus” and also the British Cameroons, 
Brunei, British Guiana, Aden, Borneo/Malaysia, the Persian Gulf and Northern 
Ireland13. Although Northern Ireland was at the time served by its own govern-
ment, its position within the United Kingdom remained one of clientelist neo-
colony, and the use of “experience in other emergency situations” – the British 
euphemism for anti-colonial wars – by government advisers attests to this14.
The colonial features of internment in Northern Ireland were apparent 
in the demographics of internees. As ministerial documents from late 1972 
indicate, following the Detention of Terrorists Order, discussions were held 
over whether or not to include Protestant terrorists in arrest lists for deten-
tion. They state that the current arrest policy did not provide for the arrest 
of Protestant terrorists except with the object of bringing a criminal charge. 
It goes on to say that “this is not the moment to start arresting Protestants 
for detention; there has been something of a decrease in large-scale organised 
Protestant terrorism”15. There was indeed loyalist violence – the 1969 bomb-
ings of electricity substations resulted in troops being drafted in to guard key 
13 House of Commons, Lord Parker of Waddington, Report of the Committee of Privy 
Counsellors Appointed to Consider Authorised Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Sus-
pected of Terrorism, Parliamentary Papers, 1971-1972, series XVIII, 53, Cmnd. 4901, 3. 
14 TNA, CAB/190/8, “Northern Ireland Intelligence Working Party: Meetings and 
Memoranda”, 8 October 1970.
15 TNA, DEFE/24/824, “Northern Ireland: Arrest Policy”, 1972.
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public utilities, and the Ulster Volunteer Force had been active since the mid-
1960s bombing Catholic-owned businesses, significantly the McGurk’s Bar 
in December 1971, which was the deadliest attack throughout the conflict, 
and carrying out gun attacks on Catholic civilians (MacAirt 2012). On the 9 
July 1971 officials recorded 36 IRA prisoners and 33 “extreme protestants”16. 
It was therefore clear that Protestants were involved in terrorist activity, for 
which they were being imprisoned; and yet, internment was a strategy used 
almost solely against the Catholic population. This is confirmed by the cus-
tody records: Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard gave the figures in May 1974 of 
loyalists constituting almost one-third of those held under court sentences 
but only one-tenth of those detained17.
This final feature of internment is important in attempting to understand 
why it was that a rent and rates strike was used as protest. Given that intern-
ment was clearly aimed at the Catholic community, it is unsurprising that the 
response shared traits, organisational and institutional, with the civil rights move-
ment that organised in the late 1960s around discrimination against Catholics 
on housing, employment and suffrage. Even previous rent strikes that were or-
ganised over housing conditions rather than discrimination were fraught with 
sectarian rivalries between tenants associations from Catholic and Protestant 
estates (Ó Dochartaigh 2005, 84). Considering that the Special Powers Act was 
such a point of resentment for the civil rights movement, it is understandable 
that the rent and rates strike was as much targeted at the emergency legislation 
and Stormont government as a whole rather than the specific policy of intern-
ment, though it helped that it was a tangible symbol of the legislation and gen-
eral discriminatory politics of the so-called Orange state. The issue of housing 
and specifically the lack of decent housing available to Catholic families was a 
central plank to the civil rights movement, particularly in Derry18. Though there 
is not space for a detailed overview of the civil rights movement in this paper, 
the pioneering work of, amongst others, Niall Ó Dochartaigh, Simon Prince, 
Lorenzo Bosi, and Geoffrey Warner has provided thorough elucidation of this 
phenomenon, including nuanced explanations of the heterogeneity of the civil 
rights movement and the various political traditions within (Ó Dochartaigh 
2005; Prince 2007; Bosi and Prince 2009; Prince and Warner 2012). 
From a longer historical perspective, the Irish nationalist struggle had 
dealt with the unfair rents, rates and tenancy agreements forced upon the 
peasantry by the British colonialists; the Land League was formed in the late 
16 PRONI, CAB/9R/238/6, “Report by Working Party on Membership of Unlawful 
Organisations”, 2 August 1971.
17 LHL, NIPC, K. Boyle, T. Hadden, P. Hillyard, “The Facts on Internment”, Fort-
night 94, 29 November 1974, 9-12, Internment Ephemera Box. 
18 For information on the Derry Housing Action Committee see Ó Dochartaigh 1994; 2005.
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nineteenth century to counter rent increases and evictions. After the partition 
of Ireland, housing for Catholics in the North continued to be unsatisfac-
tory, and the lack of housing for Catholics was made worse by the onset of 
the conflict as entire neighbourhoods were burned down during attacks on 
Catholic areas. Figures produced by the Minister of Development indicate 
that in August 1971, 300 houses were destroyed and 2,000 families registered 
on the emergency housing list19. Further investigation of this use of a rent 
strike against the policy of internment rather than against housing issues or 
rent increases is pertinent to the longer historical understanding of repres-
sive colonial policies against Irish Catholics and resistance to such repression.
3. The Rent Strike
On the first day of internment, a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associa-
tion (NICRA) emergency bulletin from the Belfast branch called for “total 
withdrawal by non-Unionists from every governmental structure, rent and 
rate strikes by the people, barricades for defence where necessary and total 
non-co-operation with a regime which has been stigmatised by the British 
establishment itself”20. This was decided during a meeting that day in Dun-
gannon – which had been a hotspot for anti-Catholic housing discrimina-
tion – between the SDLP, Nationalist Party, Republican Labour Party and 
NICRA, groups that tended towards reformism rather than revolution21. Ac-
cording to ministerial papers, the rent strike called by Belfast Civil Rights 
Association was backed officially by the SDLP and Nationalist MPs on 15 
August, with 16 August proposed as the starting date22. By 10 September, 
25,000 tenants were on strike out of 135,000 public authority tenancies, pro-
viding a weekly loss of £50,000 to the exchequer, with 32 out of 60 local au-
thorities affected by civil disobedience as well as the Housing Trust23. This 
had risen to 26,000 on strike on 29 September, a loss of £60,000 a week and 
support ranging from 3-4% to 80% in areas24. These are all official internal 
government statistics. NICRA estimated that by October 5 over £500,000 
had been withheld in rent and rates.
19 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
20 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, Emergency Bulletin, 9 August 1971, Microfiche.
21 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, “The Rent & Rates Strike - Some Questions Answered”, 
n.d., Internment Ephemera Box.
22 PRONI, COM/58/3/9, “Ministry of Commerce: Effects of Civil Disobedience on 
Gas and Electricity, 1971-1973”, 3 May 1972.
23 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
24 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/19, “Note of a meeting between UK and NI Government 
officials”, Civil Disobedience Campaign: Counter-Measures to Civil Disobedience Proposed by 
Ministry of Health and Social Services, 21 October 1971.
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According to a Northern Ireland Cabinet meeting on 21 October 1971, 
the main support for the rent strike was from the big estates in Belfast such 
as Divis, and also in the following areas: Strabane (87% uptake among local 
authority tenants), Newry (76%), Warrenpoint (66%), Derry (52%). Overall 
21% of Housing Trust/Housing Executive tenants across the country were 
on rent strike25. Statistics from the 1971 census indicate that the percent-
age of Catholics who were public renters (40.9%) was higher than the total 
percentage of public renters (34.6%), but less than the total in both private 
rental and home ownership (Melaugh 1994). This amounted to 45,436 Cath-
olic households out of a total of 147,854 publicly-rented households. The re-
liability on public housing amongst the Catholic community goes some way 
to providing an explanation of how the rent strike became widespread so 
quickly, when juxtaposed with the fact that internment targeted the Catho-
lic/nationalist community. At the same time, given the precarious housing 
situation many found themselves in following the housing struggles of the 
previous decade as well as the burning of Catholic neighbourhoods in 1969, 
it shows an impressive determination that so many took up and continued 
the rent strike despite government sanctions and threats which could quite 
easily have displaced them and ruined them financially. As Stormont civil 
servants privately admitted in May 1972: 
no doubt of the great mass of sincere and immediate support from the rank 
and file for this opposition to internment. Indeed the relative success of the cam-
paign from the beginning is probably due less to any organisation behind it, which 
can only have been minimal, than to the conviction of individual participants that 
their cause was just.26
Whilst this report admits – contrary to contemporary public assertions by 
the state, and to Eamonn McCann’s insinuation of arm-twisting (McCann 1980, 
94) – that the unpopularity of internment was more of a motivating factor in the 
success of the rent strike than pressure from the groups behind it, it is worth ex-
amining here the dynamics between the various groups behind the rent strike. 
Whilst Austin Currie describes the start of the strike with the joint call out by 
NICRA and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) published in the Irish 
News on 27 August (Currie 2004, 177), the two groups in no way could claim 
ownership or responsibility for the strike. The initial interest was sparked by lo-
cal campaign groups, forming civil resistance committees in housing estates to 
co-ordinate strike action and other protests; indeed, People’s Democracy claimed 
that the call by groups for a rent and rates strike was simply “ratifying a fait ac-
25 Ibidem.
26 PRONI, COM/58/3/9, “Ministry of Commerce: Effects of Civil Disobedience on 
Gas and Electricity, 1971-1973”, 3 May 1972.
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compli” as it had already begun in earnest27. This is supported by a rent and rates 
strike leaflet circulated just before Christmas 1971, which instructed tenants to 
proceed with the rates strike as advised by their local Disobedience Commit-
tee and obey their instructions28. One example was the Andersonstown Tenants 
Association and Civil Resistance Committee, which were based in the Repub-
lican stronghold of Anderstonstown, West Belfast. The latter group was elected 
at a public meeting at Holy Child School on Sunday 15 August to organise the 
campaign after the decision was made to embark on a rent and rates strike. This 
group was also behind the production of the P. J. McGuigan song The Men Be-
hind the Wire, which sold over 90,000 copies and was banned by the BBC29. 
One of the key figures in Andersonstown Civil Resistance Committee was Des 
O’Donnell, a local teacher, who claimed in late October that 5,000 households 
in Andersonstown were on strike – 90% of the total30.
Areas of Belfast like Andersonstown were key points of the rent strike, 
along with Ardoyne to its north east, where people’s assemblies were set up 
to co-ordinate civil disobedience – not just the rent strike, but the civilian 
warnings of army incurrence into the area. In the Lower Falls part of the 
city, take up in the Divis estate was almost 100%. In conjunction with the 
rent strike, local councillors refused to serve in certain local authorities, 
withdrawing from Strabane & Warrenpoint Urban councils, which both 
ceased to function in September 1971, and around half a dozen other local 
authorities were affected by individual councillors’ boycott31. In February 
1972, Keady council joined Strabane and Warrenpoint after the Northern 
Resistance Movement – a broad but politically radical group supported by 
People’s Democracy and republicans, set up on October 17 – and Armagh 
Resistance Council forced a resignation in order to tip the balance in favour 
of the boycott32. As F. Stuart Ross indicates in his book on the H-Block/Ar-
magh campaign, there was an attempt later in the decade to repeat this tactic 
in order to force government policy change on the issue of special category 
status for prisoners, but the lobbying of councillors at that stage was large-
ly unsuccessful (2011, 99). It is likely that the changes in legislation to deal 
with withdrawal of councillors – the Local Bodies Bill, detailed later – had 
a role its failure later that decade.
27 Queen’s University Belfast (QUB), Special Collections, People’s Democracy, “In-
ternment ’71 H-Block ’81: The Same Struggle”, Belfast 1981, 11-13. 
28 LHL, NIPC, “Civil Disobedience Rededication”, December 1971, Internment 
Ephemera Box.
29 LHL, NIPC, Andersonstown News 1, 1, 22 November 1972, Microfiche.
30 British Library (BL), Newspaper Archive (NA), P. Hildew, “Drive to Escalate the 
Rent Strike War”, The Guardian, 30 October 1971, 2. 
31 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
32 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 4 February 1972, Microfiche.
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Although the SDLP had been one of the groups involved with the origi-
nal call for the rent and rates strike, by June 1972 they were already receiving 
criticism from NICRA for advising councillors and members of public bod-
ies to return to their positions33. It is unsurprising they garnered opprobrium 
from NICRA and People’s Democracy. The latter group, who had changed 
the name of their publication from Free Citizen to Unfree Citizen after the 
introduction of internment, had encouraged strikers not to save the unpaid 
rent and rates to be paid off at a later date, but to spend the money, so that 
there would be no question of paying back arrears34. By contrast, the SDLP 
later advocated stringent terms for the recuperation of non-payment, whilst 
NICRA eventually attempted negotiations between those still in arrears and 
the Northern Ireland Office in Westminster in order to come to “humane 
arrangements”35.
There were other forms of civil disobedience against internment that 
kept attention and pressure on the government both before and after the re-
moval of Stormont’s powers and imposition of direct rule from Westminster 
in March 1972. There were of course street demonstrations in the tradition 
of the 1960s civil rights movement, the march in Derry on 30 January 1972 
that became known as Bloody Sunday being the most prominent in retrospect. 
Many demonstrations defied the parades ban including a 15,000-strong rally 
in Casement Park on 12 September 1971 (with the slogan “Smash Heath in 
the teeth!”)36 and a Christmas Day march to Long Kesh organised by the 
Northern Resistance Movement, which was stopped en route and dispersed. 
People’s Democracy’s Unfree Citizen reported doctors resigning in protest 
and ex-servicemen returning their medals37. Workers also took strike action: 
8,000 workers carried out a on a one-day strike in Derry on 16 August and 
1,000 deep sea dockers in Belfast went on strike on 7 September38. In addi-
tion, the trade unions collided with the government over the proposed recla-
mation of rent and rates money from wages, according to NICRA39. Though, 
as we shall see later, ministerial papers indicate that their stance against the 
government legislation was not particularly strong.
33 PRONI, D/3072/2/3/5, “Civil Rights”, 3 June 1972.
34 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 21 August 1971, Microfiche.
35 PRONI, CENT/1/3/27, “Letter from NICRA to Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland”, 31 January 1976.
36 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, Emergency Bulletin, 26 August 1971, Microfiche.
37 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 25 August 1971, Microfiche.
38 QUB, Special Collections, People’s Democracy, “Internment ’71 H-Block ’81: The 
Same Struggle”, Belfast 1981, 12.
39 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, “The Rent & Rates Strike - Some Questions Answered”, 
n.d., Internment Ephemera Box.
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4. Payment for Debt: The political use of social security
Not long after the rent and rates strike had acquired some momentum, it 
became clear that it was widespread enough and had enough staying power to 
create serious financial damage to the treasury. As I will show, it was not just 
financial imperative that led the government to introduce draconian legislation 
to undermine the rent and rates strike, but an attempt to contain and condition 
the Catholic citizenry whose relationship to the state was still semi-colonial. 
This latter point is supported by the use of internment without trial, aimed 
primarily at the Catholic community, as well as more generally the regulations 
in the Special Powers Act against Republicanism, and the sectarian behaviour 
of the RUC, the predominantly protestant police force of Northern Ireland.
The Payment for Debt Act of 1971 was a piece of emergency legislation 
aimed to deal with civil disobedience. The government were concerned by 
the rent strike campaign, not so much by the revenue loss but by what was 
essentially a mass opt-out of the social contract – the Minister of Develop-
ment regarded it as a “most serious threat” and stated that “neither our laws 
nor our administration are suited to countering these difficulties”40. At the 
same time as directly countering the withholding of rent payments, it trans-
formed the relationship between the state and citizens in a much more per-
vasive way than juridical acts that sought to punish certain behaviours with 
imprisonment, given the sheer numbers that it targeted. The Act allowed 
ministerial departments, mainly the Ministry for Health and Social Servic-
es, which set up a Benefits Allocations Branch, to redirect welfare payments 
to the local authorities – and later, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive 
– in order to settle rent arrears. This necessitated the collaboration of local 
authorities, a number of which, like Newry, refused to participate41. In turn, 
the government brought in Local Bodies (Northern Ireland) Bill to bypass 
local authorities that were resisting.
The implementation of the Payment for Debt Act required cross-de-
partmental co-ordination. In discussions, ministers stated that “the whole 
payment for debt machinery is part of the Government service and ought 
to be treated as such”42. The government consulted with the Confederation 
of British Industry and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, who gave their 
tacit approval of the recovery of debts through salaries as well as welfare pay-
40 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
41 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/20A, “Memorandum by the Minister of Health and Social 
Services”, Civil Disobedience Campaign: Recovery of Rents and Rates Withheld under Civil 
Disobedience Campaign, 5 November 1971.
42 PRONI, COM/58/3/9, “Effects of Civil Disobedience on Gas and Electricity”, 
Meeting of Interdepartmental Committee on Payments for Debt Act 1971, 3 January 1972.
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ments43. There was a 1969 bill called the Judgements Enforcement Act, which 
was seen as insufficient; it would be too slow and cumbersome in reclaiming 
the debts and therefore frustrate the purpose of the campaign. Furthermore, 
it did not include the possibility of reclaiming debts through social securi-
ty payments or other public fund payments; the Payment for Debt Act did, 
and would “place the Department responsible for making such payments in 
the position of an ‘employer’ for the purposes of the Act”44. As far as civil 
rights activists were concerned, civil servants and benefits clerks became as 
much a part of the security industry as the RUC and British army. Indeed, 
the broad-based and comparatively moderate NICRA stated that the civil 
servants implementing the legislation were “lin[ing] up with the repressive 
R.U.C. and British Army in their attack on the lives, livlihoods [sic] and lib-
erties of a section of the Irish people”45.
The Payment for Debt Act was rationalised by the government through 
the implication that ringleaders were intimidating tenants, forcing them to 
withhold their rent and rates. It launched a publicity campaign stating “Do 
not be intimidated”, offering a service by which tenants could secretly pay off 
their debts in October of 1971, with the press reporting that the responsible 
department, the Ministry of Development “does not claim that intimidation 
can be proved, but only that it is known to be going on”46. Along with the 
more blatant implications of intimidation against the IRA, and accusations 
that the IRA were in control of civil disobedience in Northern Ireland, it al-
lowed the government to smear those partaking as not just lawbreakers or 
criminals but as security threats. This was broadly in line with the attitude 
of the Westminster-based Joint Intelligence Committee, who by February 
1972 recorded that “[p]erhaps the most threatening feature of the present sit-
uation in Northern Ireland is the civil disobedience campaign”47. Tellingly, 
they warned of the dual effects of the civil rights campaign and Republican 
armed struggle, the former being able to “undermine the fabric of society 
slowly and by attrition” (ibidem).
The potential for the rent strike to work, in conjunction with the gen-
eral unrest on the streets, to unseat the government and heighten disorder 
was a fear that mobilised the government into action. On 2 September 1971, 
before the legislation was put forward but after the decision for action had 
43 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/19, “Civil Disobedience Campaign - Recovery Action Ex-
tract from Cabinet Conclusion”, 1 October 1971.
44 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
45 LHL, NIPC, “NICRA Emergency Bulletin”, 9 November 1971, Microfiche.
46 BL, NA, P. Hildew, “Drive to Escalate the Rent Strike War”, The Guardian, 30 
October 1971, 2. 
47 TNA, CJ/4/237, “Northern Ireland: The Year Ahead”, Drafts for Proposed Joint Intel-
ligence Committee Assessment of Northern Ireland in 1972, 2 February 1972.
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been agreed, the Northern Ireland administration wrote to the UK Home 
Secretary Reginald Maudling stating:
The situation has all the seeds of anarchy. It could rapidly degenerate to the 
point at which orderly administration could no longer be maintained in many parts 
of Northern Ireland. The consequences of such civil anarchy, super-imposed upon 
the continuing campaign of violence, are not difficult to predict, and the damage to 
the social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland could be irreparable.48
It was not just the idea that the strike would directly impinge on the abil-
ity for the administration to function, but also that it would result in a loss 
of authority and credibility of the government49. This is particularly striking 
given that just a month beforehand, the government had been slightly less 
concerned about its integrity as it introduced internment without trial de-
spite trepidations around potential legal issues, expressed during a meeting 
just three days before the first internment sweep: “We would look foolish if 
these detentions were tested and found to be illegal”50. This sense of precar-
ity on behalf of the Northern Ireland government was not unfounded – just 
over six months later in March 1972, the UK government suspended Stor-
mont and imposed direct rule. 
Whilst the rent and rate strike undoubtedly displayed a popular and 
widespread opposition to internment and the Stormont administration, the 
withdrawal of local councillors from administrations perhaps brought about 
more of a crisis in government, particularly when Newry council refused to 
co-operate with the Department of Health in advance of the Payment for 
Debt bill to help recover social security payments51. The Joint Intelligence 
Committee confirmed this fear, stating that “the fabric of local government at 
large in the province is in peril”52. Local authorities in places provided pock-
ets of resistance to the otherwise hegemonic power of the unionist-dominated 
Stormont government, ruled by the Ulster Unionist Party since the inception 
of the state in 1922. One example of this was the refusal of local authorities to 
implement rent increases. Strabane Council had attracted the ire of the govern-
ment in July of 1971 when it refused to implement public housing rent increases 
48 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/19, “Letter to Reginald Maudling (UK Home Secretary)”, 
2 September 1971.
49 PRONI, CAB/4/1615, “Cabinet Meeting”, 14 September 1971.
50 PRONI, NIO/25/3/16, “Stormont meeting on Internment”, 6 August 1971.
51 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/20A, “Memorandum by the Minister of Health and Social 
Services”, Civil Disobedience Campaign: Recovery of Rents and Rates Withheld under Civil 
Disobedience Campaign, 5 November 1971.
52 TNA, CJ/4/237, “Northern Ireland: The Year Ahead”, Drafts for Proposed Joint In-
telligence Committee Assessment of Northern Ireland in 1972, 2 February 1972.
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mandated by central government53. The year before in January 1970, the Stra-
bane Civil Rights Association backed Strabane Town Tenants Association in 
their decision not to pay a rent increase of 7.5% imposed by the council54. The 
rent and rates strike gave the Stormont government the opportunity at last to 
discipline rebellious councils; Strabane was the first to be censured for running 
an overdraft and refusing to raise house rents, and was dissolved in October 
1971 under the new Local Bodies (Emergency Powers) Bill55.
The Local Bodies Bill was proposed on 2 September 1971 via Reginald 
Maudling, the UK Home Secretary, and allowed the Governor of Northern Ire-
land to remove members of a local authority, which failed to carry out its func-
tions. It authorised the Minister of Development to appoint a commissioner to 
take over the functions of that authority56. This prevented communities from 
bringing pressure on their local authorities in order to strengthen their oppo-
sition to the Stormont government, and removed local government as a site of 
contention, replacing it with managerial and bureaucratic implementation of the 
increasingly securitised welfare policies, in conjunction with the movement of 
housing responsibilities from (often sectarian and discriminatory) local authori-
ties towards the newly-formed Housing Executive. A similar process was to oc-
cur over a decade later in Britain, when Margaret Thatcher introduced a series 
of rate-capping policies and break-up of metropolitan councils, which aimed to 
undermine large seats of counter-power in local government controlled by those 
undertaking protest and disobedience in opposition to the Thatcher government.
The Local Bodies Bill in any case allowed Stormont to bypass the dis-
ruption of council procedures that the protests caused. As the rent and rates 
strike continued unabated, the government broadened its action against strik-
ers. In March 1972, the Payment for Debt Act was extended to salaries paid 
by the state; whilst this was subsequently clarified to mean salaries only and 
not wages, in October 1972 this was extended too to wage earners57. Before 
the Act had even been introduced, NICRA accused the government of threat-
ening, and then attempting to “starve people into submission” by targeting 
the most vulnerable and impoverished, those on social security benefits58. 
People’s Democracy recorded rent strikers having social security payments 
53 PRONI, CAB/4/1605/9, “Memorandum to the Cabinet by the Minister of Devel-
opment (R H Bradford)”, 2 July 1971.
54 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Citizen Press, 24 January 1970, Microfiche.
55 PRONI, CAB/9/N/46/1, “Local Bodies (Emergency Powers) Bill (Northern Ire-
land)”, 1971.
56 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/19, “Letter to Reginald Maudling (UK Home Secretary)”, 
2 September 1971.
57 PRONI, COM/58/3/9, “Civil Disobedience: Letter from R H Kidd, Ministry of 
Finance to Secretary of State”, 20 October 1972.
58 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, Emergency Bulletin, 26 August 1971, Microfiche. 
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cut off as early as 3 September, before the act was brought in59. Clearly this 
was a form of punishment taken against the most vulnerable, but the exten-
sion to those salaried by the state drew in an additional demographic, and in 
doing so entrenched the conditionality of state benefits, the position of the 
recipients as employees who, like those with state salaries, could have their 
pay docked or withdrawn based on political decision.
The extension of the Payment for Debt Act was gradual. It received royal 
assent on 14 October, and the Benefits Allocation Branch was set up by the 
Ministry of Health and Social Services in order to redirect benefit payments 
towards offsetting withheld rent and rates. This led to an escalation of the 
strike to include as many bill payments as possible, the civil rights confer-
ence in Dungannon on October 24 advising withholding of radio and tel-
evision licenses, land annuities, ground rent, income tax, gas, electricity and 
water bills60. This was accompanied by demonstrations and riots including 
one in Newry following the killing of a young man that led to a no-go zone 
being established, and a riot also in Long Kesh internment camp which was 
at that time holding hundreds of detainees61. The government reported that 
bills and rates were being withheld in February 1972 in preparation for the 
extension of the legislation from benefit recipients to include those in receipt 
of state salaries. At this stage they acknowledged that only a third of the 
20,000+ rent defaulters could be dealt with by the re-allocation of benefits62.
However, as the strike wore on, more and more defaulters dropped out. 
In February 1973, though the skeleton Stormont regime that existed after 
direct rule backed out of the inclusion of wage earners in the Payment for 
Debt mechanism, and the Andersonstown News claimed 26,000 still on strike 
in Belfast, Derry and Newry, by October this had halved to 13,000 accord-
ing to the Northern Ireland Secretary as quoted in the People’s Democracy 
paper Unfree Citizen63. By the time the SDLP’s Austin Currie – newly ap-
pointed housing minister in the new executive – made a statement to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly on 3 April 1974 urging for an end to the rent 
strike, there were still 11,000 tenants on strike, although just 1,500 of these 
were not subject to the Payment for Debt Act and therefore having deduc-
tions made from benefits or salaries64. In 1986, long after the official phas-
59 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 3 September 1971, Microfiche.
60 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, Emergency Bulletin, 9 November 1971, Microfiche. 
61 LHL, NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 29 October 1971, Microfiche. 
62 PRONI, CAB/9/B/312/20A, “Letter to Cabinet Ministers”, Civil Disobedience Campaign: 
Recovery of Rents and Rates Withheld under Civil Disobedience Campaign, 17 February 1972.
63 LHL, NIPC, Andersonstown News 1, 13, 16 February 1973, Microfiche; LHL, 
NIPC, People’s Democracy, Unfree Citizen, 15 October 1973, Microfiche.
64 PRONI, CENT/1/3/27, “Northern Ireland Office: Press Release of Currie’s State-
ment to the Assembly”, 3 April 1974.
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ing out of internment, the Belfast Telegraph reported the “legacy of debt” left 
in Divis flats, West Belfast, still being paid either voluntary or, more often, 
through the Payment for Debt Act65.
5. Effects of the Act
The Payment for Debt Act must be understood as part of the extensive legal 
mechanisms, to a large extent consisting of emergency law, aimed largely at the 
Catholic community. As such it had the effect of reinforcing the perception of 
the Northern Ireland state as unionist-dominated and its mechanisms as entirely 
sectarian. This perception is illustrated in the first edition of the Andersonstown 
News in November 1972 – the local paper of the area of West Belfast where the 
rent strike was perhaps strongest – which claimed that the Act meant that “the 
terror apparatus for suppressing the Catholic population seemed complete”66. 
This may seem hyperbolic compared to the regulations in the Special Powers 
Act but what underlined this legislation was its attempt to condition the behav-
iour of those involved in civil disobedience – predominantly Catholics and Irish 
nationalists – by making social security contingent on obedience at a time when 
the nationalist community was taking unprecedented steps towards humiliating 
the discrimination in Northern Ireland through these methods. 
This was made clear in a government statement in November 1971. 
Their three-pronged strategy was defeating terrorism and restoring the rule 
of law, creating the conditions in which “responsible elements of the com-
munity” can ensure enjoyment of equal rights, and, as a corollary to equal 
rights, “the proper fulfilment of the obligations of good citizenship, under 
the law and otherwise”. Specifically in dealing with rent and rates default-
ing, the government stated it would reclaim the money because it would be 
intolerable if “part of the community refuses to bear its fair share of public 
burdens”67. Thus the universal nature of social security and the welfare state 
was made clearly conditional on not partaking in dissident behaviour. That 
same month, the Minister of Community Relations – whose predecessor, 
the only Catholic in the cabinet, had resigned at the introduction of intern-
ment – decided to delay and discourage grants to projects in deprived areas 
of West Belfast where civil disobedience was strong68.
65 LHL, NIPC, L. White, “What Went Wrong”, Belfast Telegraph, 27 November 1986, 
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The Payment for Debt Act was further extended beyond its specific use 
to deal with those withholding rent for reasons of civil disobedience. A 1984 
information sheet provided by a West Belfast housing action group advised 
tenants that, under the 1971 legislation, statutory bodies such as the Housing 
Executive (which was created in 1971 to take over the management of pub-
licly-owned housing) were “covered by legislation to recover money owed to 
them by deducting it from your Social Security benefits”, as well as deduct-
ing from wages and claims and compensation such as redundancy pay. There 
was no mention of rent strike or civil disobedience – legislation introduced 
to deal with the rent strike had simply been extended to recover all housing 
debt, including on houses since vacated, through social security benefits, re-
gardless of the original reason69. This is backed up by ministerial papers that 
show that in April 1976 – months after the ending of internment, and the 
phasing out of special category status for political prisoners – the Payment 
for Debt Act was extended to include all debts to the Housing Executive, not 
just non-payment because of the rent strike70. A year later, a government press 
release confirmed that the Act was extended so that the Benefits Allocation 
scheme involved those unable to pay gas and electricity bills too, allowing 
for the inclusion of utility companies as well as the Housing Executive in the 
re-allocation of benefit payments71. This went directly against the decision 
at the beginning of the Payment for Debt implementation whereby, when 
proffering the idea of recovering unpaid rent from all those in debt, not just 
those involved with the civil disobedience campaign, it was rejected because 
“the emergency legislation was presented to Parliament and recommended 
as a measure to cope with supporters of the civil disobedience campaign”, 
and therefore it would be “wrong” to use it for ordinary debts72. The final 
totalisation of the Payment for Debt Act beyond the issue of civil disobedi-
ence was therefore completed in 1977.
6. Conclusion: From ’68 to H-Blocks
The rent strike that started in 1971 as a response to the re-introduc-
tion of internment certainly benefited from the civil rights movement of the 
1960s in terms of the organisational elements and infrastructure – NICRA 
69 LHL, NIPC, Falls Community Council, Guide to Housing Executive Policies, 1984, 
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71 PRONI, CENT/1/3/27, “Northern Ireland Office: Press Release”, 13 April 1977.
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and People’s Democracy, two of the main groups supporting the strike, had 
the personnel and capacities for publicity to drive the campaign. This goes 
some way to explaining the immediacy of the strike. In 1970, People’s De-
mocracy had launched a rent strike against a rent hike and bus fare strike 
against the cost of tickets73.
There was also a rent strike of around 35,000 people in the Republic of 
Ireland in November 1971 against the 1966 Housing Act, and later in Great 
Britain against the 1972 Housing Finance Act. The latter was significant in 
that, like in Northern Ireland, some local authorities rebelled against the leg-
islation that had been imposed on them by central government and defended 
their tenants on strike. The British government then brought in measures 
to punish local councillors for not implementing the rent increases, making 
them personally financially liable. Indeed during a 1972 railworkers’ strike, 
the British government in Westminster considered bringing in legislation to 
“curtail the entitlement to social security benefits which enabled strikers to 
transfer to the community at large their responsibilities for supporting their 
families during a strike”74. Although this was not introduced, the condition-
ality of social security based on good behaviour was behind this concept as 
it was with the Payment for Debt Act.
The rent and rates strike was effective in hitting the exchequer precisely 
because of the demographic situation – Catholics were more likely to take 
action in protest against internment, as it was Catholics who tended to be 
interned, and were overrepresented in public sector housing. The participa-
tion in the rent strike was not simply a communal reaction that can be ex-
plained by religious denomination/ethnic identity, as there were particular 
areas where the takeup in the rent strike was higher, and where local council-
lors were more truculent, which tended to coincide with civil rights-era areas 
of contention where the groundwork had been laid in terms of organising 
groups and committees to coordinate action. Enniskillen, for example ,had 
seen police take action, with military back up, in November 1970 when a 
ban on marches was broken by civil rights activists75. According to NICRA, 
this was the one town in Fermanagh where support for the rent strike was 
near on 100%76.
One consequence of the rent strike was the total break between the 
SDLP and the civil disobedience movement which was further emphasised 
73 LHL, NIPC, PPO0553, People’s Democracy, “Down with Fares”, 1970; LHL, 
NIPC, PPO0511, People’s Democracy, “Not a Cent on the Rent”, 1970.
74 TNA, CAB/128/50/15, “Cabinet Meeting”, 9 March 1972.
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tion”, 9 December 1970.
76 LHL, NIPC, NICRA, Emergency Bulletin, 26 August 1971, Microfiche.
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during the anti-H-Block/Armagh campaign. The SDLP ended up joining 
the executive that was created in 1973 under the Sunningdale Agreeement, 
with Austin Currie, who had been a champion of both the Derry-based hous-
ing action struggle and the rent strike in its early stages, becoming housing 
minister. Currie advised tenants to come off strike, despite the fact that in-
ternment was still in active use. Ironically, his position was shortlived when 
the executive fell in May 1974 following the loyalist UWC strike. This posi-
tion of the SDLP was strongly rebutted by local tenants steering groups. In 
Andersonstown, West Belfast, tenants argued that since the strike was not 
started by the SDLP but by “mass, spontaneous and unorganised protest of 
the group”, no one group could own it and have the authority to call it off77.
The apparent betrayal of the SDLP for their positions of power in the 
executive – as illustrated by a 1974 Sinn Féin poster of an SDLP dagger stab-
bing someone in the back78 – drew another comparison with the rent strike 
in Britain against the Housing Finance Act. After Currie had issued an ul-
timatum threatening an increase in arrears payments in April 1974, activists 
drew attention to what was happening in Britain, calling on SDLP members 
of the executive to resign and either obtain an amnesty for all tenants or “ac-
cept the fate of the Clay Cross councillors and pay the arrears themselves”79. 
In Clay Cross, one of the most truculent local authorities where central gov-
ernment eventually took over control of council mechanisms, the burden of 
the unpaid rent was placed upon the individual councillors, some of whom 
faced financial ruin as a result.
Overall the 1971-1974 rent and rates strike has made little mark on Irish 
history, perhaps deservedly in that its impact on the trajectory of the conflict 
is relatively small compared with other terrains on which the injustices of 
Stormont and Westminster were fought. But the government’s response through 
the Payment for Debt Act was a significant turning point in the overt use of 
social security to punish political dissdence. It is in the use of this emergency 
legislation that the rent strike becomes significant. The postwar settlement of 
the welfare state, council housing and social security was to irrevocably fracture 
during the 1970s. Whilst Northern Ireland was certainly in a different situation 
to Great Britain at this point in history80, and had a different relationship with 
welfarism, the mechanisms by which the state could use social security to pun-
ish and reward were certainly not dissimilar from those deployed in Britain in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This is apparent in the fact that the sale of council hous-
77 LHL, NIPC, Andersonstown News, 29 November 1973, Microfiche.
78 LHL, NIPC, PPO0277A, Sinn Féin, “Support rent and rates strike”, 1974. 
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80 A description of the particulars of the welfare state settlement in Northern Ireland 
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ing stock to tenants was introduced in Northern Ireland before the rest of the 
United Kingdom, albeit with conditions that didn’t exist in Britain to ensure 
the replacement of housing stock81. The reward and punish mechanism is vis-
ible in the extension of the Payment for Debt Act to include salaried workers, 
and the further extension of its use to all debts not just those incurred through 
civil disobedience. We see in this the tendency for the welfare state to develop 
an employer-employee relationship, establishing greater purchase over the con-
trol of behaviour as universality paves the way for behavioural conditionality. 
In Northern Ireland in 1971, this was of particular use for the state and 
security forces dealing with political opposition to internment and the Stor-
mont government. At the same time, there were continuities from the treat-
ment of Catholics through the welfare system of the postwar period into the 
1970s. The issue of housing is the most germane as discrimination there was 
a motivating factor of the civil rights movement, and the large numbers of 
Catholics reliant on social housing and welfare payments underlines why the 
civil disobedience campaign against internment took the form it did, and why 
the state’s response was effective. What came out of the rent and rates strike 
was mass opposition to the government’s discriminatory policies that height-
ened after the onset of the conflict, and also the defiance of a vast proportion 
of the Catholic community to weather the draconian attempts to stop the 
strike. What it also illustrates for historians is the state’s willingness to use a 
catalogue of tools to contend with political unrest in Northern Ireland, be-
yond military and policing strategies against the armed struggle. That social 
security was part of this is instructive not just in understanding Northern 
Ireland’s precarious position within the United Kingdom throughout the 
twentieth century, but in re-assessing the trajectory of the welfare state and 
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